Recent Developments in the Right of Sureties in Defaulted Federal Construction Contracts by Creyke Jr, Geoffrey
Boston College Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 9
10-1-1963
Recent Developments in the Right of Sureties in
Defaulted Federal Construction Contracts
Geoffrey Creyke Jr
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Construction Law Commons, and the Government Contracts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey Creyke Jr, Recent Developments in the Right of Sureties in Defaulted Federal Construction
Contracts, 5 B.C.L. Rev. 139 (1963), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol5/iss1/9
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RIGHT OF
SURETIES IN DEFAULTED FEDERAL.
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
GEOFFREY CREYKE, JR.*
A dispute as to who is entitled to receive undisbursed contract
proceeds frequently arises when a federal construction contractor who
is bankrupt, or who has assigned his contract to a bank or who owes
taxes or is otherwise indebted to the government defaults and a Miller
Act' surety is called upon to complete performance under the per-
formance bond or make payment under the payment bond. Generally
speaking, except where it conflicts with tax liens or setoffs of the
United States, the position of such sureties is progressively being
recognized as superior to the rights of trustees in bankruptcy and
assignee banks.
Historically, sureties have assumed great risks and have thus felt
it their basic right to be subrogated on a priority basis to the full in-
terests of a principal. Bond premium costs, in order to be within the
means of the average contractor, have to be predicated upon the
surety's being able to look to a responsible principal and his being able
to secure guarantees and indemnification agreements, as well as rights
of subrogation. The absence or weakening of any of these elements
can only be reflected in the reluctance of sureties to accept further risks
and the actuarially calculated charges for premiums and in stricter re-
quirements for indemnification, collateral or other guarantees. How-
ever, with the space age advances in construction methods and the
increases in the dollar volume, magnitude and complexity of federal
contracting, sureties' risks and problems have correspondingly in-
creased.
In the past twenty-five years, the sureties' traditional position of
subrogation has been challenged more and more. For instance, since
1940, when the Federal Assignment of Claims Ace was amended to
permit assignment of government contracts to financial institutions to
facilitate financing,3 there has been a succession of conflicts with as-
signee banks. The problems of the courts have been complicated by
the fact that both banks and sureties frequently have substantial,
though conflicting, equities in a default situation.
The interests of the government often clash with the rights of
the sureties, for the modern federal tax system requires that a con-
* Partner, Hudson and Creyke, Washington, D.C.; Member of the D.C. and Mary-
land Bars.
1 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. 270(a) (1958).
2 12 Stat. 596 (1862), as amended, 41 U.S.C. 15 (1958).
3 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), 41 U.S.C. * 15 (1958).
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tractor pay his own social security and unemployment taxes, as well
as withholding his employees' income taxes. In addition, the sureties'
position may be further confused by the government's claims on other
contracts and transactions which the bonded contractor may have
undertaken for the government. Finally, there is the traditional con-
troversy between sureties and the trustees in bankruptcy for a defunct
principal.
The case law bearing on these problems has been based on overall
equities, usually substantial on all sides, major questions of legislative
intent and statutory interpretation.
For purposes of discussion here, in each instance, let us assume
a set of circumstances where:
(a) a contractor has a construction contract with the United
States and has furnished standard performance and payment bonds
under the Miller Act; 4
(b) the contractor has defaulted and the surety has been called
upon and has made payment under the payment bond or completed
the work under the performance bond, or both and
(c) the United States has undisbursed contract proceeds on hand.
What then are the relative rights and priorities of:
(1) The surety v. the trustee in bankruptcy?
(2) The surety v. the assignee bank?
(3) The surety v. a United States Government tax lien?(4) The surety v. a United States Government claim for setoff
arising out of the principal's other contracts or transactions?
Surety v. Trustee in Bankruptcy
The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the
position that a surety is entitled to precedence over a trustee in bank-
ruptcy for a defunct contractor in Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co. 5 Al-
though there was a division with respect to the theory, eight members
of the Court joined in the holding, four of whom concurred in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Black that the surety was entitled to the fund
on the basis that it was subrogated to the claims of the contractor or
the laborers and materialmen to the extent of monies disbursed to
them. Three Justices, including Mr. Justice Clark, believed that the
surety was only entitled to the fund because it was standing in the
shoes of the United States and that, unless overruled, United States v.
Munsey Trust Co.,' precluded the holding of the majority and re-
4 See U.S. Standard Forms 25 & 25A, 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 41 U.S.C. App., H 54.15-.16
(1958).
5 371 U.S. 132 (1962).
6 322 U.S. 234 (1947).
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quired that the basis for the decision be subrogation to the rights of
the United States since the laborers and materialmen had valid claims
against the surety itself under the payment bond. Mr. Justice White
dissented in silence!
The United States Court of Claims carefully followed Pearlman
in United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States' allowing summary judgment
in favor of a surety as against a trustee. However, the right of the
United States to offset a tax claim ahead of both was stipulated.
Actually, in every instance, Supreme Court decisions have favored
the surety. As early as 1896, in Prairie State Bank v. United States,'
the Court held that a surety completing work under a performance
bond was subrograted to the rights of the United States and was there-
fore entitled to receive the ten per cent retention fund in the possession
of the United States, saying with respect to the surety:
[The surety's] right of subrogation, when it became capable
of enforcement, was a right to resort to the securities and
remedies which the creditor (the United States) was capable
of asserting against its debtor Sundberg & Company, had the
security not satisfied the obligation of the contractors, and
one of such remedies was the right based upon the original
contract to appropriate the ten per cent retained in its hands.'
In 1908, in Henningsen v. U.S.F. & G. Co.," the Supreme Court
recognized the surety's priority right to contract funds as a result of
disbursements made under a payment bond.
These two cases dealt with bonds furnished under the Heard Act"
which, after several amendments, was ultimately replaced by the
Miller Act. The principal difference between the two is that the Miller
Act requires the furnishing of separate performance and payment
bonds whereas a single one covering both requirements was called for
by the Heard Act. In addition, the Miller Act contains certain
procedural provisions to avoid a multiplicity of litigation in different
jurisdictions.
Two factors apparently led the Supreme Court to again consider
an issue which many people felt had already been completely resolved
by the Prairie State Bank" and Henningsen" cases. First, questions
were raised as a result of the enactment of the Miller Act in 1935 and
its amendment in 1958. Second, the Supreme Court seemed to want to
7 319 F.2d 893 (Ct. CI. 1963).
164 U.S. 227 (1896).
9 Id. at 232.
10 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
11 28 Stat. 278 (1894).
12 Supra note 8.
18 Supra note 10.
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review the reasoning in United States v. Munsey Trust Co." in which
it held that laborers and materialmen have no enforceable right against
the United States as such but rather have rights exclusively under the
payment bond.
Today, the question of relative priority as between a surety and a
trustee in bankruptcy seems to have been put to rest by the Supreme
Court. However, because of the differences of opinion expressed by the
Court itself in the Pearlman case, the fascinating and most difficult
question still remains: "to whom is the surety subrogated?"
In Pearlman, the majority indicates that the surety is subrogated
to the rights of the materialmen and laborers which it has paid. How-
ever, Mr. Justice Clark's separate opinion states that, since the
majority expressly denied that it was overruling United States v.
Munsey Trust,' which states that the laborers' and materialmen's
rights are limited to claims under the bond, the majority opinion is
contradictory in that the subrogation can only be based upon the right
to subrogation to the rights of the United States. Either line of reason-
ing can easily lure one onto a merry-go-round from which it is difficult
to dismount.
For instance, where does this leave such questions as the right of
the United States to set off independent claims, the obligations to as-
signee banks who have in good faith advanced moneys induced by the
language of the Assignment of Claims Act," the prohibition against
setoffs and recoupments established in the Act based on other rights
and, of course, inevitably the claims for various types of tax obliga-
tions? If the surety is subrogated only to rights of the United States,
the banks can make a powerful claim to priority on the basis of this
Act.
These and other problems will be considered in sections which
follow.
Surety v. Assignee Bank
Prior to 1940, the federal government prohibited all assignments
of claims; although it is true that under some circumstances claims
were recognized on the part of assignees due to special equitable con-
siderations. In some instances the United States simply said that the
prohibition against assignment in the prior acts was a defense in bar
which it could assert or not within its discretion, in effect as a matter of
sovereign grace.'
Essentially, the current Assignment of Claims Actm was passed
14 Supra note 6.
15 Ibid.
15 Supra note 2.
17 II McBride & Wachtel, Government Contracts, ch. 16 (1963).
18 Supra note 2.
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to enable assignments for the purpose of funding the war effort during
World War II. A 1951 amendment had the express objective that,
except in cases of fraud, a bank or financing institution receiving pay-
ments pursuant to an assignment thereunder would not be subject to
later recovery by the government of amounts received!'
Thus, a situation has developed in which banks are encouraged
to lend money to public contractors. Federal law apparently recognizes
that all assignments are "a valid assignment for all purposes" and that
they are not subject to any setoff or reduction for obligations arising
out of other matters. It would appear that the lenders are not to be
subjected to any exposure for recoupment of payments received except
in cases of fraud.
At first blush it would thus appear that a bank holds a preferred
position and indeed this is the view of all federal courts except the
Court of Claims which consistently rules that the surety has priority
over the bank." This is particularly important because the Court of
Claims, through one means or another, has emerged as the forum in
which most of these controversies are decided. It has determined that
it has jurisdiction in every instance where there are funds in the hands
of the government, and it thus far sits secure in the fact that the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the cases involving this issue.
However, as has been pointed out previously, the sureties recognize
the precedence of the United States to set off tax obligations as was
done in United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States," and thus we have the
anomaly of a bank having a preference over independent claims of the
United States and a surety having preference over the bank."
In any event, approaching this issue of relative priority from the
standpoint of decided authorities, a substantial line of Court of Claims
cases headed by Royal Indem. Co. v. United States" and followed
recently in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States" holds that,
notwithstanding the removal of the statutory bar upon assignment, the
assignee can acquire no greater rights than the assignor and the as-
signor's rights are subject to the subrogation rights of a surety.
The contrary theory, followed by the federal courts, has as its
cornerstone Coconut Grove Exch. Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,"
which gave priority to the bank, holding it to be a valid assignee. This
doctrine was extended somewhat in Bank of Arizona v. National Sur.
15 S. Rep. No. 217, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
20 Speidel, "Stakeholders" Payments Under Federal Construction Contracts: Pay-
ment Bond Surety vs. Assignee, 47 Va. L. Rev. 640 (1961).
21 Supra note 7.
22 Supra note 17.
as 117 Ct. Cl. 736, 93 F. Supp. 891 (1950).
24 304 F.2d 465 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
25 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
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Corp?' which held that if the money lent by the bank (within
reason) was used in the discharge of the contractor's obligations, and
hence for the purpose of fulfilling the contract, unless the funds were
diverted the surety's exposure was consequently reduced and therefore,
in equity, as well as in a literal reading of the law, the bank was entitled
to priority as assignee?'
It should also be noted that the Court of Claims' position on
jurisdiction has not been constant. In Arlington Trust Co. v. United
States," it rejected jurisdiction, but Maryland Cas. Co. v. United
States" overruled Arlington Trust. Also there have been numerous
dissents, for instance, by Chief Judge Jones and Judge Madden in
Royal Indemnity" and Judge Larramore in Maryland Casualty.
One type of situation which has never been finally resolved in the
Court of Claims arises where a bank has been induced to make the loan
by a surety who was fully cognizant of the obligations to the bank at
the time of writing the bonds or who participated in the establishment
of the overall relationship between contractor, bank and surety.
To recapitulate, the situation is this: (1) The surety's position
has evolved over a period of time as a consequence of the desire on
the part of the government and the courts to treat all concerned with
equity and fairness. (2) The position of the bank is a creature of
statute. (3) The question of who has the fund will control the outcome
since if there are still funds in the hands of the government the case
will be heard in the Court of Claims with all parties called in and
the surety will be given a preference. Otherwise, the bank will prevail.'
(4) The Supreme Court has refused certiorari in National Sur. Corp.
v. United States," a holding which follows Royal Indemnity. The
Court cited Royal Indemnity" in a note to Pearlman v. Reliance Ins.
Co.' with an implication of approval.
It should also be noted that the Court of Claims bases this third
party practice on the Contract Settlement Act of 1944.35 However, this
writer feels that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in cases not
involving contract termination has been fully set out by a statute which
was considered thoroughly by Congress and rewritten in 1953 and
20 237 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956).
21 Sadler, Governments Contracts—Rights of Assignee and Surety, 24 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 708 (1956).
28 134 Ct. Cl. 251, 139 F. Supp. 556 (1956).
29 135 Ct. Cl. 428, 141 F. Supp. 900 (1956).
38 Supra note 23.
31 Supra note 20.
32 132 Ct. Cl. 724, 133 F. Supp. 381, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
83 Supra note 23.
34 Supra note 5.
as 58 Stat. 663 (1944), 41 U.S.C. 114 (b) (1958). See supra note 29; Seaboard Sur.
Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 686, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959).
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revised in 1954.3° No express extension of the Court of Claims
jurisdiction was provided by Congress therein. This, it is felt, indicates
that the Court of Claims should not be concerned with these essentially
private controversies where the United States is a mere stakeholder
and a nominal party in interest. They should be settled in the regular
federal courts.
Further, no decision has ever adequately answered the argument
that assumption of jurisdiction by the Court of Claims denies private
litigants the right of a jury trial, a constitutional privilege which should
transcend any statute. Certainly the court's statement in Maryland
Casualtt that the acceptance of an assignment constitutes an ac-
quiescence to jurisdiction is most difficult to follow. Some of these issues
arose in Newark Ins. Co. v. United States in the Court of Claims
and the court ruled on two motions.' However, the case was settled
without a final determination.
Meanwhile, with the law in the stage that it is at the present,
banks, surety companies and contractors would be well advised at the
very inception, prior to the arising of any controversy, to enter into
agreements among themselves which would forestall any disputes and
establish between them rights of priority. In considering such agree-
ments it would also be well to keep in mind the superior position a bank
enjoys under the provisions of the Assignment of Claims Act, with
respect to independent obligations and recoupment by the United
States as previously mentioned.
Legislation has been suggested and, of course, efforts have been
made to bring the priority conflict to the United States Supreme Court,
to date unsuccessfully. In view of the inescapable logic of the several
lines of reasoning offered and the dilemma resulting from their ap-
plication, it would appear that legislation dealing with the entire subject
would be the best ultimate solution.
Meanwhile, in the absence of any agreement, as suggested above,
perhaps the most practical solution would be a proceeding in the nature
of an interpleader in a federal district court, as was suggested in
Professor Speidel's article," where at least a jury trial is available.
Understandably, sureties could not view this plan with any enthusiasm I
Surety v. United States Tax Lien
At last we have come to an area in which the law is perfectly clear.
The United States, asserting a tax lien, is entitled to set off this sum
so 28 U.S.C. §/ 1491-1505 (1958).
37 Supra note 29.
88 Newark Ins. Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 655, 169 F. Supp. 955 (1959),
assignee's motion to dismiss government's cross-claim denied, 149 Ct. CI. 170, 181 F.
Supp. 246 (1960).
38 Supra note 20.
145
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
against a surety who is claiming a right to the contract proceeds. In
United States v. Munsey Trust Co.," the surety on a payment bond
undertook to say that, being subrogated to the rights of laborers and
materialmen who had something in the nature of a lien, it had superior
rights. The Court pointed out, however, that the bonds provided for
payment to the laborers and materialmen and that there was a general
right of setoff in the United States. Prior cases which hold, in effect,
that the surety's right of subrogation cannot operate contrary to the
rights of the United States are United States v. National Sur. Co."
and Globe Indem. Co. v. United States." Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v.
United States" and General Cas. Co. v. United States" follow Munsey
Trust and extend the general rights of setoff on the part of the United
States to tax claims. Recently, sureties do not appear to have con-
tested the priority of tax liens.
As mentioned previously, in 1963 in United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United
States's with respect to a counterclaim therein for federal taxes "the
parties have conceded that this claim is a valid offset against the claims
of the Surety and the Trustee."' Note, however, that Central Bank v.
United States" holds that the anti-setoff provisions give a bank priority
over United States tax liens, even those involving withholding taxes on
the subject contract, on the theory that this was the express intent
of Congress. Thus, we have the anomalous situation of sureties in the
Court of Claims coming ahead of banks but behind the United States
on a tax claim while the bank is ahead of the United States on a tax
claim. Further, if the theory of the recent Pearlman's decision is fol-
lowed, it may re-open the arguments asserted in the Munsey Trust and
Standard Accident cases that on this basis sureties have a prior claim
to the proceeds of the contract itself.
Surety v. United States Government Claims for Setoffs
From Other Transactions
Little need be added on the general rights of the United States to
setoff in addition to what has been mentioned in the prior section. In
fact, the foundation for the holdings in the various tax lien cases lies
in the basic tenet that the United States has the same rights as a private
party to setoffs, McKnight v. United States." In Munsey Trust, the
40 Supra note 6.
41 254 U.S. 73 (1920).
42 84 Ct. Cl. 587, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 707 (1937).
43 119 Ct. Cl. 749, 97 F. Supp. 829 (1951).
44 130 Ct. Cl. 520, 127 F. Supp. 805, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955).
45 Supra note 7.
46 Id. at 894.
47 123 Ct. CI. 237, 105 F. Supp. 992 (1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 639 (1953).
48 Supra note S.
49 98 U.S. 179 (1878).
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setoff represented the amount of damage sustained as a result of the
default of the contractor in connection with another job which it bid
and did not perform. There the excess above the amount deposited with
the contractor's bid was allowed as a setoff. Since that decision the law
on this subject has been firmly established." Further, by statute" the
Court of Claims is expressly given jurisdiction over setoffs asserted by
the United States, so the question of a proper forum does not exist
here.
Conclusion
It is suggested that the ultimate solution to these controversies
should come from legislation; first, definitely establishing an order of
priority in the rights to contract proceeds and second, resolving the
jurisdictional controversy.
Meanwhile, as stated, contractors, banks and sureties would be
well advised to agree among themselves, when their commitments are
originally made, upon their relative rights and priorities.
50 Supra note 17.
51
 28 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958).
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